\u27I wouldn’t put them on eBay!\u27 Discourses on money, markets and meanings amongst IVF patients volunteering for a UK \u27egg sharing for research\u27 scheme by Haimes E
  
 
1 
 
‘I wouldn’t put them on eBay!’ Discourses on money, markets and meanings amongst IVF 
patients volunteering for a UK ‘egg sharing for research’ scheme. 
 
 
Erica Haimes, PhD 
Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences (PEALS) Research Centre 
Newcastle University 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU 
U.K. 
 
For inclusion in Malmqvist, E. and Zeiler, K. eds. ‘Giving, Selling, Sharing: bodily exchanges 
across borders’ London: Routledge 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper draws on recent research with IVF patients volunteering for a UK ‘egg sharing’ 
scheme in which, when volunteers provide eggs for research, they receive reduced fees for 
IVF treatment. Such a scheme raises questions because ‘payments in kind’ appear to 
undermine altruistic notions of ‘sharing’. Sandel argues that money ‘crowds out’ other 
values worth caring about (2012, 9). However, interviews with volunteers for the scheme 
suggest that money is not the one-dimensional, fungible entity that such a position 
presupposes; rather, money has variable contextual significances that tend to remain 
unheard and hence unanalysed. In listening to what interviewees say, rather than 
stipulating the significance of what they might be thought to think, it is possible to identify 
different sets of distinctions to those found in most bioethical analyses, in relation to the 
appropriateness of the involvement of money and its effects.  
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‘I wouldn’t put them on eBay!’ Discourses on money, markets and meanings amongst IVF 
patients volunteering for a UK ‘egg sharing for research’ scheme. 
 
I: INTRODUCTION 
The growing global demand for human tissue for research and treatment is accompanied by 
debates about ethically appropriate ways of encouraging individuals to donate tissue 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB) 2011). These include debates about the ethics of 
offering money ‘for’, or in association with, the provision of tissue. Concerns include 
whether offers of money: constitute an undue inducement; compromise individual 
autonomy and the ability to give informed consent; exploit poorer populations; contribute 
to the commodification of the human body; compromise human dignity; crowd out other 
values such as altruism (Radin 1996; Svenaeus 2010; NCoB 2011; Sandel 2012; Hoeyer 
2013). 
 
Particular concerns have been raised about offering money to women to encourage them to 
provide eggs and other reproductive tissue for research (Braun and Schulz 2012; Roxland 
2012; Haimes et al. 2013). For example, should women undergoing IVF have to consider the 
loss of their eggs to research when they might need them for treatment (Waldby and Carroll 
2012) and should non-IVF patients undergo the potential physical risks of IVF when there is 
no therapeutic need for them to do so (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) 2006)? 
 
However, these debates lack insight from the very populations under discussion: those who 
provide tissue. To rectify that deficit this chapter draws on a socio-ethical investigation of 
the views and experiences of women who have volunteered for a UK scheme providing eggs 
for research. This scheme, which I shall refer to as the ‘Newcastle Egg Sharing for Research 
scheme’ (the NESR) is considered controversial because it advertises for current IVF patients 
to ‘share’ 50% of the eggs they produce in a single IVF cycle (as long as they produce six or 
more eggs); those who provide eggs receive a £1500 discount on their private IVF fees for 
that cycle (currently £3,000-£3,700). The eggs provided go towards somatic cell nuclear 
transfer research and, more recently, to research on avoiding the transmission of 
mitochondrial diseases.  
 
II: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
One reason why the NESR is considered controversial (either progressive or transgressive) 
and has attracted criticism (Waldby et al. 2013) is that it appears not to conform to 
European legislation or practice (Braun and Schulz 2012). However, though the EU appears 
to place clear restrictions on the offer of incentives for the donation of body parts, the NCoB 
(2011) draws attention to the varying ways in which the potential entanglements of money 
and human tissue are actually described. While some EU documents insist that donation 
should be ‘unpaid’, and procurement be on a ‘non-profit basis’, the Oviedo Convention 
states that the human body and its parts ‘shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain’ (cited 
in NCoB 2011,70). The ‘as such’ remains unexplicated (Pattinson 2012). The World Health 
Organisation bans ‘monetary payments’ or ‘rewards’ and the Declaration of Istanbul calls for 
a ban on organs being ‘bought or sold for material gain’. The UK Human Tissue Act 
distinguishes between ‘commercial dealings’, ‘rewards’ (financial or material) and 
‘reimbursements’ in the supply of human material (NCoB 2011, 70).  
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The researcher-clinicians who designed the NESR were licensed to implement it by the HFEA 
in 2007. They claimed, amidst controversy, that the NESR mirrored the well-established ‘egg 
sharing’ for treatment scheme, in which one infertile woman pays for the treatment of 
another infertile woman when receiving half her eggs. Roberts and Throsby argued this 
claim was a way of establishing the NESR as ‘business as usual’, silencing ethical objections 
(2008, 161). Since October 2011, the HFEA allows payments, for expenses and 
inconvenience, of £750 per cycle for egg donors and £35 per visit for sperm donors (Hamm 
and Anton 2012). These amounts were designed to encourage donation for treatment and 
research, without ‘attracting those who are merely financially motivated’ (Pattinson 2012, 
583).  
 
In the USA practice is varied. Since 2009, New York State’s stem cell board allow 
‘compensation’, beyond direct expenses, to women who provide their eggs to research: up 
to $5,000 is considered reasonable; $5,000 to $10,000 requires further justification, and 
amounts over $10,000 are prohibited (Roxland 2012; Haimes et al. 2013, 285). Egli et al 
(2011) concluded that American women elsewhere who had volunteered, but failed to 
proceed, to donate eggs for research did so because they were not offered financial 
compensation. Noggle et al (2011) offered financial compensation to American women 
volunteering to provide eggs for either treatment or research and reported that some did 
donate to research. Neither article reported any systematic investigation or analysis of the 
women’s reasoning.   
 
Clearly there are different views over the desirable relationship between money and body 
parts and over the ways in which that relationship can, and should, be characterised 
(Svenaeus 2010).  
 
III: CHARACTERISING THE DEBATE ON MONEY AND BODIES 
A brief overview of the debates can be gained from comparing two prominent accounts:  
Sandel (2012) and the NCoB 2011 report. There are many other participants in these 
debates as the references cited hitherto indicate; I have chosen these simply because they 
‘represent’ different conclusions, while exploring similar terrain.   
 
Sandel ‘represents’ the concerns raised over the moral implications of the progressive 
monetization of social life, suggesting that this increases both inequality and corruption 
(2012,8). He argues that when everything can be bought and sold, those with less money 
are excluded from full social participation, and that market values corrupt or ‘crowd out’ 
other, more important, values (2012,9). Attaching a price to the ‘good things in life’ makes 
them worth more, financially, but degrades how we value them because our attitudes to 
them change. He is concerned that we will devalue human beings if we treat them or their 
body parts as commodities to be bought and sold for profit.  These are moral and political 
issues: ‘To resolve them we have to debate, case by case, the moral meaning of these goods 
and the proper way of valuing them.’ (2012,10).  
 
Finding a resolution is complicated by having to decide whether to participate in ‘morally 
questionable markets’ in order to achieve desirable ends, such as having children (2012,79) 
or, perhaps, advancing clinical research. Will marketizing such practices by, for example, 
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introducing incentives, ‘displace’ non-market norms (2012,90)? Instead of focusing on 
whether particular incentives will ‘work’ (e.g. ‘will researchers recruit more egg donors by 
providing incentives to donate?’) a moral assessment should be made ‘of the attitudes and 
norms that money may ... crowd out’, in case this changes ‘the character of the activity in 
ways we would (or at least should) regret? If so, should we avoid introducing financial 
incentives into the activity, even though they might do some good?’ (2012,91). He 
acknowledges that some exchanges can appear to benefit both parties without anyone else 
suffering but is concerned that such exchanges can nonetheless diminish the value of that 
which is being exchanged; those goods become tainted by the very fact of exchange 
(2012,114). Sandel’s worry is that ‘the marketization of everything’ diminishes shared 
citizenship, so those with money, and those without, lead increasingly separate lives 
(2012,203).   
 
In contrast to Sandel, the NCoB noted that while they value the altruistic donation of human 
material they do not accept that systems based on altruism and systems involving payment 
are ‘necessarily incompatible’ (2011,viii). They reject Sandel’s ‘crowding out’ argument since 
they do not regard the offer of money as necessarily unethical. They suggest, however, that 
the following require close scrutiny when money is offered: the welfare of the donor; the 
welfare of ‘closely concerned’ individuals; the potential threat to the common good, and the 
professional responsibilities of the health practitioners (2011, 7-8). This contention that 
money is not inherently contaminating is important, in light of the reference to ‘gifts’ as ‘the 
sanctioned metaphor’ for bodily contributions (Svenaeus, 2010). 
 
As we have seen, the NCoB identify different ways in which the use of money is described, 
so they propose their own typology. All transactions involving money should be termed 
‘payments’ and different types of payments then distinguished as follows: (i) ‘recompense’ 
for losses incurred (as ‘reimbursement’ of expenses or ‘compensation’ for non-financial 
losses); (ii) ‘rewards’ that constitute a material advantage for donating, which could include 
‘remuneration’ if wage-based, and (iii) ‘purchase’, defined as ‘payment in direct exchange 
for something (e.g. a certain amount for a kidney, or per egg).’ (2011,70).  
 
The report adopts an ‘intervention ladder’ through which the ethical acceptability of any 
intervention to encourage donation might be evaluated. Rung 1 interventions would just be 
information about donating; rung 6, the highest, would include financial incentives that 
leave the donor better off as a result of donating (2011,viii-ix). Rung 6 interventions are no 
less ethical than rung 1 but their ethical implications require closer scrutiny because of their 
potential threat ‘to wider communal values’ (2011,5). The authors also distinguish between 
‘altruist-focused’ and ‘non-altruist focused interventions’: the former are intended to 
remove barriers to people who are ‘already inclined to donate’; the latter are intended to 
encourage donation by offering a reward ‘sufficient to prompt action’ (2011,5). They  ‘reject 
the concept of the purchase of bodily material, where money exchanges hands in direct 
return for body parts’ and distinguish ‘purchase’ from uses of money that ‘reward or 
recompense donors’ (2011,5). The amount of ‘work’ that this report needs to do, to build an 
argument for allowing money to be involved, is noteworthy, underscoring the assumption in 
most debates that the entanglement of money and body parts is damaging.  
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Despite their differences, the NCoB and Sandel agree on the need to attend to the detail of 
particular cases and contexts. Sandel calls for a ‘case by case’ debate (2012,10) and the 
Chair of NCoB report says, ‘this enquiry has enabled us to compare how particular ethical 
ideas and concepts are used in different circumstances, and has thus helped us understand 
the importance of the context in which decisions and actions take place.’ (2011,viii; 
emphasis in original). Nonetheless, each relies on claims about the motives and preferences 
of the people directly involved in these areas. I want to ask instead how those directly 
involved characterise their own motivations, preferences and actions. In order to do this  
we need to listen more to what they actually say, rather than speculate about, and then 
stipulate the significance of, what they might be thought to think. 
 
 
IV: INTERVIEWEES’ CHARACTERISATIONS OF MONEY AND MARKETS 
Elsewhere I have discussed various aspects of the entanglement of money and eggs in the 
NESR: whether it is necessarily exploitative; whether it leads to undue inducement, a loss of 
autonomy and weakened informed consent, and, briefly, whether the entanglement 
necessarily constitutes the commodification of the human body (Haimes, Taylor and 
Turkmendag 2012; Haimes 2013; Haimes and Taylor 2013). Those papers show that 
volunteers welcomed the scheme and had no regrets volunteering for it, but were not 
volunteering under circumstances of their choosing; they would prefer to provide eggs once 
their own IVF treatment was completed. They volunteered to provide fresh eggs (whose 
usefulness for their own treatment is therefore unknown at the point of provision) during 
treatment because of their experiences of the UK IVF bio-economy in which state funded 
treatment is difficult to access and private fees are high. The discount was important to 
their decision to volunteer but not determinative: some withdrew even though that meant 
they had to pay full fees and almost all declined to donate eggs to the treatment of other 
couples even though that meant even cheaper fees.  The discount was one of a number of 
complex variables which they juggled in trying to achieve their primary goal of having a baby 
(Haimes 2013).   
 
In this chapter I focus on how interviewees spoke about the ‘money and markets’ aspects of 
the scheme. Did they accord the same significance to the issues raised by writers such as 
Sandel and the NCoB and, if so, how did they navigate their way through them? I first 
consider how volunteers reasoned through the question of whether they were selling their 
eggs. An American colleague, on hearing about the NESR, commented that ‘in other words’, 
women were selling their eggs. However, how are such translations into ‘other words’ to be 
regarded? How are they used, by whom, to make what claims, with what social, legal and 
moral significance? Did interviewees hear this translation: as a provocation; as a reasonable 
representation of their actions; as a puzzling characterisation, or in some other way? How 
did they frame and explain their views; what connections did they make or reject; which 
aspects were they consistent and clear about; what comparisons and contrasts did they 
draw; which elements did they find challenging, confusing or contradictory?  I explore these 
questions further through an analysis of how interviewees discussed the maximum and 
minimum amounts of discount they should receive and alternative ways to organise the 
discounts.  To what extent do their views suggest that they regarded themselves as 
engaging in market-like behaviour?   
 
  
 
6 
 
1) Are women who participate in the NESR selling their eggs? 
I have collected interviewees’ views under three broad headings categorising ways of 
discussing this question.  
 
(i) No:  
Most interviewees were clear, some emphatically, that they were not selling their eggs:  ‘Oh 
no, definitely not!...[it was] just part of the process... and you just got a little bit of money 
towards it... I wouldn’t just do it to get money’ (M09:663-710). The strength of expression 
might indicate moral abhorrence but what informs that abhorrence?  
 
One couple introduced the language of ‘payment’ themselves. The woman said,  
‘I didn’t actually think of it as “oh well, I’m getting paid for my eggs”, I didn’t ever feel like 
that...’ 
Her partner added: ‘...I don’t think you can put a price on, “here’s an egg, there’s a £100”...’ 
The woman continued, ‘I don’t know {pause}...I never really thought of it as getting money 
and selling...it’s like selling a bit of yourself and I’ve never felt that way. And...going on the 
open market, I’d feel a bit like going to the cattle market... 
Her partner: ‘Then it’s the highest bidder, isn’t it? You may as well put yourself on eBay 
{laughter}’ (M01: 1149-1190; 1192-1229) 
 
The direct link between money and eggs invokes associations with ‘payment’ and ‘selling’, 
yet, importantly, it did not ‘feel like that’ to the couple because they were focused on 
succeeding with IVF.  This exchange displays many of the features apparent in other 
interviewees’ discussions, in distinguishing between what they were doing and what 
outsiders might regard as selling. For interviewees the idea of selling links to ideas about 
cash, profit and the initial motivation of ‘doing it for the money’ as opposed to doing it for 
an entirely different reason. 
 
(ii) ‘I suppose you are selling them, really...’: 
Occasionally interviewees edged towards the possibility that the NESR could be defined as 
selling eggs but embedded that within other factors, including the reasons why they are 
being sold (if indeed they are), the conditions under which this occurs, and an ongoing 
interest in what happens to the eggs: 
 
‘ I don’t think egg sharing is selling your eggs, I think it’s a way of complementing your 
fees...you know where [they’re] going to and what’s happening with them... I’m more 
reassured that whatever’s happening in research, you’ve got some guidelines... I suppose 
you are selling them, really, but you’re selling them for a better cause.’ (M28:1322-73). The 
implication here is that the NESR simply complements normal IVF. The interviewee sounds 
defensive and does not explain why she ‘supposes’ it could be selling but if it is to be so 
defined, it can be justified by the research context. 
 
One woman, acknowledging that she could be seen as selling her eggs because she was 
engaging in a financial deal, still felt there was a difference: ‘I suppose it can be seen as 
selling, you’re giving something and you’re getting payment for it.’ She  then compared that 
to selling a DVD on the  internet: ‘The money I get back for that is not anything specific, it’s 
just cash [but] if I’m giving my eggs for research, the money that’s coming back is being used 
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specifically on treatment...You are receiving a payment for doing it, but I can’t take that 
money, put it in my pocket and have a shopping spree...I’m not even getting money back, I’m 
getting money taken off a bill for treatment and in the same arena. It’s the only way I can 
explain it...’ (M27:1619-1711). 
 
Interviewees felt an implicit criticism in the suggestion that they were selling eggs: ‘...am I 
selling my eggs? Yeah I probably am and I don’t care! {laughter}...But who are these people 
saying to me “you’re selling your eggs”? Are these people that have never been through 
this...?’ (M05:1048-59). Her defensiveness leads her to question the credentials of those 
raising such issues.  
 
For interviewees, terms such as ‘selling’ do not have simple, uncontested meanings; they 
reasoned out why the involvement of money might appear to be synonymous with ‘selling’ 
but, at the same time, why its involvement was experienced  differently in these particular 
circumstances. I shall return to these features in the Commentary, in light of further data. I 
turn now to consider interviewees’ discussions about whether, if the NESR is not defined as 
selling, they would actually sell their eggs?  
 
(iii) Would interviewees sell their eggs? 
 The extensive distance that most interviewees placed between the NESR and the idea of 
selling is shown in this discussion. The utterances ranged from brief rejections of the idea - 
‘No, not at all!’ (M04:754-7); ‘No, never!’ (M05:820-70) -  to more detailed considerations. 
In the latter they deployed a series of distinctions that indicated the boundaries between 
acceptable and unacceptable transactions around eggs. One said, in reference to selling 
eggs on the open market, ‘No, I don’t really agree with that...it’s a bit like going abroad and 
buying a liver isn’t it? ...I know it’s a little bit different but I don’t agree... eggs are precious 
but there [are] ethical things, aren’t there...I don’t think that’s right...’.  When asked why, 
she replied, ‘I don’t know...I feel like it’s selling something from my body ...I haven’t got a big 
opinion on it because it’s just something that I wouldn’t do... It’s different with research...I 
feel like I’m doing some good...but as for going on the internet and selling your eggs...I don’t 
agree with that...I[would]  just feel like I was selling my body...’(M02:704-48). 
 
Interviewees used the internet as short-hand for the open market. One illustrated the 
stylistic tropes that others used when she joked: ‘I wouldn’t put them on eBay! No. But a 
proper clinic...’ (M26:818-39).  She later emphasized, ‘No, not the internet, no. Maybe if 
times get hard! {laughing}’ (M26:1175-82). The use of joking suggests unease with both the 
idea of selling and with the involvement of the internet. Another compared selling eggs on 
the internet to selling to ‘back street butchers’ , conflating the two charges normally levelled 
at illegal abortionists, of operating in dubious unhygienic settings and using poor quality, 
physically damaging, techniques, suggesting her strength of feeling about this possibility 
(M27:1523-85). 
 
Concerns were raised about what would happen to the eggs if they were sold over the 
internet:  ‘My fear would be “what are they going to be used for?”, whereas I felt confident 
that my eggs were going to be used with the [clinic] as they said they were going to be 
used...it goes back to trusting what’s going to happen to them...{sigh, pause} ... it doesn’t 
seem {pause} as comfortable as sharing your eggs through a process that you’re already 
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doing’ (M11:921-41).  ‘A process that you’re already doing’, similar to the earlier phrase, ‘in 
the same arena’, implies associating with places, people and purposes already known and 
accepted, whereas the internet is associated with the unknown.   
 
One woman expressed the views raised by others when asked what she thought of a system 
where women were given £1500 cash for eggs and could decide for themselves how they 
wanted to use it:  ‘...to me that puts it in the same category of stories you hear about people 
in America or in third world countries where they sell their...organs...where do you draw the 
line? What if you have a drug addict who’s desperate for money and so they’ll donate you 
50% of their eggs...[what] if it was an alcoholic...’. It is right to target IVF patients, ‘because 
it’s women who are in this who understand why you need [eggs] and I think anybody else 
would only do it for the money and I think that’s when it becomes unethical’ (M25:972-
1025). IVF patients provide eggs, ‘for all the right reasons’ (M27: 1619-1741). That the use of 
cash might produce certain consequences, including attracting the wrong sort of donors, 
encapsulates interviewees’ views on why the NESR is not seen as selling and what could 
happen if it were to be ‘more like’ selling.  
 
2) Should egg providers receive a ‘fee per egg’ instead?  
I asked interviewees whether the reduced fees discount could be packaged in any other 
way, to see what priorities, limits, and boundaries were expressed. For example, would they 
prefer a system in which they were given a fee for each egg, rather than a fixed discount, 
regardless of the number of eggs provided? As can be seen above, the idea of deciding a 
specified sum of money for a single egg was taken as partly definitive of ‘selling’ but was 
also something that was often raised as presenting a conceptual, moral and practical 
obstacle to actually selling. Perhaps not surprisingly then, most interviewees rejected the 
suggestion of a fee per egg. However, the grounds they gave for doing so proved very 
interesting given that their reasons for participating in the NESR in the first place was to 
access cheaper IVF cycles.   
 
Interviewees forcibly rejected the ‘fee per egg’ suggestion because it was unfair, as the 
number of eggs a woman produced was not under her control and no one could do anything 
extra  to produce more and ‘earn’ a bigger discount. As one said, deploying a phrase that 
shows how difficult IVF treatment is, ‘[they are all] going through the same trauma however 
many eggs they are producing’ (M18:748-80). Similarly, others said, ‘you can’t do anything 
more than what your body will let you do’ (M26:1107-73) and ‘it’s not up to you, you can’t 
do anything about it. No, it should be the same. Price per egg is wrong {laughing}’ (M22:939-
54). 
 
Interviewees also argued that a ‘fee per egg’ system would put IVF patients under additional 
pressure, especially if it meant that they could only afford another IVF cycle by producing a 
certain number of eggs: ‘...you’re under so much pressure to produce as many eggs as you 
can [in IVF]...I wouldn’t like the pressure then of saying each egg was worth £250 or 
something [compared with ] the guarantee that you were going to get £1500 to be able to 
afford the cycle...‘Cos if you didn’t get that many eggs, how are you going to pay for the rest 
of the cycle? ....’ (M11:954-985).  
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Interestingly, one woman, when asked about ‘fee per egg’, immediately clarified, ‘You buy 
each egg?’ , then reasoned,  ‘Erm, {long pause}, no I don’t think that’s fair...if someone who 
isn’t lucky enough to produce so many eggs, gets less money or less of a chance [of 
pregnancy] than someone who does produce a lot of eggs, just cos they’re unfortunate 
enough to not have so many eggs, it doesn’t make their sacrifice any less, well it’s harder for 
them really to make that decision than someone who produces a lot of eggs’ (M07:712-47). 
This use of ‘sacrifice’ echoes comments elsewhere in the interviews that women would 
prefer to give eggs after they had achieved a pregnancy rather than during their IVF 
treatment. 
 
For interviewees, as IVF patients, the value of eggs is calculated in relation to the eggs’ 
contributions to increasing the chances of pregnancy. In general, interviewees thought that 
more eggs could mean more chances of pregnancy but they also know that an exceptionally 
high number of eggs does not have a proportionately increased effect on those chances, so 
if one has 40 eggs, giving away 20 is unlikely to reduce those chances significantly whereas 
giving away two out of four eggs is much more likely to do so. Eggs, in and of themselves, 
are not regarded as having any innate value or price; rather, eggs have a dual worth, 
representing both the chances of pregnancy and the chances of more treatment; both are 
important to interviewees. From this perspective, the involvement of money neither erodes 
nor increases the ‘preciousness’ of eggs; similarly, exchanging eggs for more treatment does 
not devalue those eggs (Haimes 2013). The ‘fee per egg’ suggestion was not objected to on 
the moral grounds that this would be more like selling, or ‘purchase’, as defined by the 
NCoB (2011) but on two different and associated grounds: that of the practical goals of 
reducing stress during IVF and that of fairness, within the arduous IVF process of producing 
those eggs. 
 
Interviewees’ responses to the ‘fee per egg’ suggestion display several features: first, the 
fact that none of them had suggested such a scheme themselves indicates that they were 
not motivated by the wish to maximise their income from their eggs; second, it elicited 
references to their not being in control of the processes of producing eggs; third, that lack of 
control meant that it was not in their power to produce more eggs, and, fourth, that then 
elicited highly moral discourses around ‘fairness’, ‘earning’, ‘deserving’. The language of 
fairness could be partly defensive as interviewees do not know how many eggs they will 
produce in any particular cycle and they would not want to be someone who gets less of a 
discount.  Nonetheless, this is such a recurrent, and strongly emphatic, feature of their talk 
that there is clearly a pervasive concern for others like themselves who are going through 
IVF.  
 
3) Maximum and minimum amounts for the discount   
I asked interviewees about their sense of acceptable and unacceptable maximum and 
minimum levels of discount on IVF treatment for providing eggs to research. This helps to 
tease out whether they had strong views about the actual figures offered or about what 
their eggs are ‘worth’ and whether they volunteered for the NESR wanting to negotiate 
good terms for themselves.  Interviewees generally liked the rough, though inaccurate 
(because total IVF fees have increased whereas the discount has remained at £1500) 
symmetry of 50% eggs for 50% discount. One interviewee, asked: ‘So they took half your 
eggs?’ replied, ‘Yeah and I paid half the money and I think that’s quite fair’ (M22:925-41).  
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Although interviewees were uncomfortable discussing specific sums of money - ‘...it sounds 
awful... it’s not all about the money’ (M02:779-806) -  a clear sense of what would be too 
low emerged,  judged in relation to the full IVF price and their chances of more treatment. 
When asked if £500 would have been enough, one replied, ‘probably not, no {laughing}... 
But half price for us was great, we can get another round of treatment in’ (M05:909-940). 
Another picked out her own figure for what would be too low: ‘it’s not very nice having your 
eggs retrieved. I think £1500 is quite a reasonable amount...I wouldn’t do it for £50! Oh my 
God, no! {laughs} ’ (M26:870-91). Commonly £500 was a figure mentioned as not being 
enough, either because that was a sum they could imagine raising from elsewhere without 
having to contemplate giving up some of their eggs or because that would buy an 
insufficient portion of an additional cycle of treatment. Interviewees also identified dangers 
in offering too high a discount. ‘I think any more than [£1500]  and you might end up with 
any Tom, Dick or Harry coming through the door ...you end up with the wrong type of people 
coming in for treatment...people who are only in it for the money and are only in it for the 
reduced cost’ (M04:762-806). 
 
In brief, interviewees valued the discount for its ability to increase their chances of private 
IVF treatment, not as a sum of money in its own right; as with the discussion on selling, they 
are keen to establish that they are not volunteering for the NESR ‘for the money’ but within 
a context in which they can gain something for themselves and can give something back. 
Embarrassment when discussing money in detail might be partly because in the UK we are 
not used to discussing money in relation to health care; these comments might be ‘heard’ 
differently elsewhere. Nonetheless this is evidence that money is troubling and that 
interviewees are keen to establish certain views about the different types of money being 
made available and discussed.  
 
V:  COMMENTARY: 
There is a range of claims in the interviews about what the NESR is, and what it is not, in the 
ways in which money features in its transactions. In supposing, sometimes reluctantly, that 
the NESR ‘must’ amount to the selling of eggs simply because it is (amongst other things) a 
financial transaction, interviewees are reflecting Strathern’s (2012) observation that in many 
debates, when money enters the room, all other considerations fly out of the window. 
However, in also resisting that easy and singular association between money and selling, 
and by focusing on those ‘other things that it is amongst’, interviewees are also 
demonstrating that everyday life, and the role of money within it, is somewhat more 
nuanced and complex than usually supposed (Zelizer 1997; Almeling 2011). 
 
It is not easy to resist that singular association, as can be seen by the style in which 
interviewees seek to articulate their views. They pause, hesitate and joke as they stress how 
their experiences feel different to other apparently more authoritative claims and they seek 
ways of mitigating what they hear as criticism, or even accusation, of selling. Jokes 
expressed the outer limits of what might be deemed acceptable: one cannot possibly 
auction eggs on eBay. The interviewees, while actively seeking a discount on their IVF fees, 
are nonetheless troubled by money.  
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Zelizer (1997,2) observes that money is commonly thought to create cold personal 
relationships and not surprisingly (since interviewees encounter those views in all sorts of 
aspects of their lives) some of those fears are heard in the quotations above. It is partly 
because of this standard view that Sandel (2012), as one of its proponents, can blur his use 
of terms such as ‘money’, ‘markets’, ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ as if these have commonly 
accepted and almost interchangeable meanings. However, Zelizer’s riposte is that people 
introduce all sorts of distinctions about how money operates in their everyday lives: 
‘distinction and multiplication appear on every hand.’ (1997,4). This reflects more closely 
interviewees’ reasoning on these issues: we can identify a range of distinctions that they 
draw and can show how those link to, and bump up against, other ideas, to see which 
distinctions matter, and in what ways. At least five lines of distinction emerge in 
interviewees’ discourses on ideas around eggs, money and selling. 
 
(i) the IVF context: 
We have argued elsewhere (Haimes et al. 2012) that the IVF context is highly influential on 
the interviewees’ framing of their experiences: they are only involved in the NESR because 
they are IVF patients and because their over-riding goal is to have a baby. This framing 
encompasses their orientations towards the role of money in those experiences, including 
their views that there should be more state funding of IVF and that private fees are  too high 
(Haimes 2013). It is not surprising then that the IVF context shapes some of their views on 
whether the NESR constitutes egg selling. A key distinction that they draw in asserting a 
difference between the NESR and selling is that, in participating in the NESR, they are not 
doing anything much different from ‘normal IVF’; it is ‘part of the process’, ‘in the same 
arena’ as their treatment. The meaning and value of eggs are calculated with reference to 
the chances of success in their own IVF treatment, in which the open market is deemed 
irrelevant.  Participation in the NESR it is not ‘about’ the money but ‘about’ getting 
treatment and having a baby and they would not be providing their eggs other than to get 
cheaper treatment. It does not feel like selling because their subjective motivation lies in a 
completely different direction and social domain.  
 
The importance of the IVF context in framing their views of the relationship between money 
and eggs is most clearly seen in interviewees’ comments on the ‘fee per egg’ suggestion. 
Their concerns switch from distancing themselves from the idea of selling to aligning 
themselves with other women also undergoing IVF, where every egg counts. The potential 
unfairness of ‘fee per egg’, plus its likely impact in increasing stress, anxiety and poor 
responses to treatment, completely negates other considerations and it was firmly rejected. 
Although Weber describes money as ‘impersonal’ and Simmel asserts its ‘heartlessness’ 
(Zelizer 1997,6) neither resonates with interviewees’ discussions about a ‘fee per egg’; 
rather, they display a concern for others and for fairness rather than for maximising their 
own gains over others.  Such a unanimous, other-concerned, response counters Sandel’s 
pessimism about money driving out altruistic concerns; the data considered here suggests 
that whether or not this happens depends on how the money is embedded, and acted upon, 
within specific socio-cultural contexts. The interviews support the NCoB’s (2011) assertion 
of the importance of context, and fill in the details lacking in that report, by providing 
indications of the discursive practices through which relevant contexts are constituted and 
deployed as both a topic and a resource for reasoning. 
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(ii) the nature of the money that is or is not involved: 
One of the characteristics of debates about money is the assumption that ‘money’ is a 
single, uncontested, entity, but we have already seen Zelizer’s (1997,2) suggestion that in 
everyday life all sorts of distinctions are drawn between types of money. This is clearly the 
case for these interviewees. While some move towards saying that the NESR is egg selling 
because it is a financial transaction, they and others also suggest that the money involved in 
the NESR has distinctive features that differentiate it from the money involved in selling. For 
example, the NESR money is not ‘cash’ or a ‘profit’ or a ‘cheque’ or ‘disposable income’ or 
‘earnings’ or ‘money back’; it is ‘money off’ and it is ‘half price’. Also it is money directed 
towards a specific use, as a ‘means to an end’, for accessing further, cheaper, treatment; the 
money, as Zelizer (1997) would say, is ‘earmarked’ and not transferable to other activities, 
such as a shopping spree. These distinctions establish that whilst some transactions 
involving money might be problematic, the particular transaction around the NESR is 
morally acceptable. 
 
The references by some interviewees to how money in the form of cash might attract the 
wrong people for the wrong reasons reflects Almeling’s (2011) argument that we should 
look at how, and what type of, money actually changes hands in the gamete market, to 
understand how the transaction is experienced and understood by those involved (clinicians 
as well as gamete providers). As our analysis shows, attention to contextual detail is 
important; it might be partly because actual money does not change hands in the NESR that 
interviewees are able to make some of these distinctions.  
 
Interviewees’ discursive practices reflect the NCoB’s contention that ‘money may be 
conceptualised in many ways’ (2011,4) though they do not echo the neatness of the report’s 
monetary typology. The report is written broadly from the perspectives of state agencies 
and research bodies concerned to find ethical means of promoting the safe contribution of 
human materials to treatment and research; one can only speculate how its register, and 
categorical distinctions, might differ if written from the perspective of actual and potential 
providers of those bodily materials.    
 
(iii) not participating in market-like behaviour: 
Interviewees do not see themselves as engaging in market-like behaviours. Beyond the 
practical difficulty of not knowing how to participate in the market, even if they had wanted 
to, they argued, implicitly and explicitly, that their actions and motivations distinguished 
them from those operating in the market place. For example, going into the market 
presumes a profit motivation, ‘doing it for the money’, which all denied; rather, they were 
participating in the NESR mostly to help themselves and partly to help research. Orienting 
their actions towards an unseen, third party-beneficiary (‘research’) rather than towards 
personal profit was how many interviewees expressed their lack of interest in the open 
market. 
 
Market behaviour also requires detailed calculations of a price for the goods in terms of 
what the market will bear, but no interviewee could see how to put a price on an egg, let 
alone proposed a rationale for one price over another. The ‘fee per egg’ suggestion would 
have been an opportunity to do this but instead interviewees directed the discussion 
towards the unfairness of such proposals. Similarly, the discussion around maximum and 
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minimum levels of discounts produced very few examples of specific sums of money, 
particularly at the higher end. Interviewees’ assertions that they were not seeking a profit or 
a surplus are supported by the nature of their discussion in these areas. Also, as several said, 
laughing about going on eBay, they were not interested in selling their eggs to the highest 
bidder, a practice that would be definitive of market-like behaviour. Similarly, the fact that 
eggs cannot be appropriately compared with DVDs underscores the absence of any market-
like behaviour amongst interviewees since the market depends on a notion of the lack of 
difference between goods and their essential sameness as commodities. Also none 
bargained for an actual 50% fees discount even though they struggled to pay private IVF 
fees and with the ‘monied’ world of IVF in general.  
 
This appears to be how interviewees address Sandel’s challenge of how to decide whether 
to participate in ‘morally questionable markets’ (2012,79); interviewees clearly do link 
market reasoning with moral reasoning. However, their distancing of themselves from 
market like behaviour is in many ways curious because it is in marked contrast to the ways 
in which the market place for IVF treatment, in which they find themselves, operates 
(Winston 2011). Nonetheless, as reflexive actors, interviewees are constituting both the 
contexts of relevance for their actions while at the same time constituting themselves as 
certain types of persons; in this case, persons who do not see themselves as traders in the 
market place for human eggs. 
 
(iv) the ‘location’ of the transaction: 
Interviewees’ perceptions of the degrading nature of the market are seen in the 
comparisons they draw with places like cattle markets: cold, dirty, noisy, lacking human 
dignity and focused on auctioneering for the highest price. Similarly, the reference made to 
places like ‘backstreet butchers’ conveys the strength of concern about just where, and 
how, any market in eggs would function. References to the internet elicited further 
concerns about a lack of regulation and whether using the internet would be an explicit 
venture into the open market. The internet’s market goals, practices and consequences, 
were contrasted with the NESR’s goals, practices and consequences. 
 
A key factor for interviewees in distinguishing participation in the NESR from participation in 
the open market is that the NESR transaction takes place in ‘the clinic’, either the clinic they 
know from previous treatments or the clinic they ‘know’ as an abstract but nonetheless 
‘proper’ place. This is contrasted with the internet, and occasionally ‘abroad’, ‘America’, the 
‘third world’, which are all seen as odd, ‘out of place’, alien locations, unregulated and 
managed by unknown people, as far as any dealings around eggs are concerned and which 
thereby transform any transaction accordingly. The synedochal reference to the ‘clinic’ 
indicates all that is right about the experience: cleanliness, familiarity, regulated, staffed 
with ‘proper’ doctors and nurses who know what they are doing and who can be trusted, 
and attended by women who have a better understanding than others of just what eggs 
mean. The clinic also has ‘proper’ reasons for encouraging this transaction, assisting the 
‘good cause’ of research. Interviewees’ utterances convey the idea of the clinic as a socially, 
physically and, most important, morally comfortable place in which transactions around 
eggs should occur.  
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The concern with the ‘location’ of the transaction suggests that the introduction of money 
via the NESR is made possible and acceptable through existing social relationships: partly 
through pre-existing associations between IVF and money but mostly through pre-existing 
interpersonal relationships between the patient and clinic staff, plus the location of the 
clinic within the familiar institution of the National Health Service. As far as the NESR is 
concerned, social relationships are not being eroded by money, as is often assumed, but are 
the very element that makes the involvement of money possible in the first place. As Zelizer 
observes, it is not the case that money necessarily flattens or corrodes social relationships 
(1997,18-21), as is assumed in classic Marxist analyses, but this can only be understood if we 
explore how markets are actually organised and experienced (Almeling 2011). 
 
(v) retaining an interest in their eggs: 
Zelizer (1997,7-8) also challenges Marxist assumptions that money alienates subjective 
connections between individuals and the objects they produce and reduces all personal 
relations to the ‘cash nexus’. Interviewees’ discursive practices support Zelizer’s challenge: 
part of their concern about selling eggs on the open market is that they would not know 
what happened to them and they fear that they could be misused. It is not the case that 
once they receive the discount they no longer care about their eggs. As we have seen, it also 
matters that the scheme is provided by an organisation that they know. This illustrates 
further that, far from being obliterated by the offer of a discount, subjective connections are 
central to the process of volunteering for the NESR. 
 
Interviewees perceive their eggs as not easily separable from them and their bodies. While 
eggs might be physically separable (IVF relies on that) they are not morally separable; 
interviewees retain a sense of responsibility towards their eggs, even after donation. They 
emphasized the similarity between their eggs and other body parts and talked of eggs as 
being part of their bodies and indeed part of their selves. They did not distinguish between 
the characteristics of eggs and other body parts along the commonly accepted lines of: 
multiple eggs/single organs; reproductive tissue / non-reproductive tissue; use for 
treatment / research. Rather, in discussions around money, they emphasized how the eggs 
relate to, and are understood with reference to, the whole body. This is an apparent 
contradiction to the suggestion elsewhere (Haimes 2013) that the IVF process emphasizes 
the entification of eggs and their exchangeability. However, what appears to be the case for 
interviewees is that eggs can be detached and exchanged to achieve the goal of having a 
baby but not for lesser goals like making money. In other words, there is entification of eggs 
in IVF, but this is not necessarily true of all eggs in all situations; only in certain contexts do 
eggs become entities, at other times they are not only part of the body but also part of the 
self.  Thus, whilst Sandel (2012) is concerned that the very fact of exchange taints that which 
is being exchanged, the interviewees demonstrate that, in the case of eggs at least, ‘that 
which is being exchanged’ does not have one single, stable definition, let alone one single, 
stable status, financial or moral. 
 
To return to the original concerns that provoke these discussions: does the entanglement of 
money and eggs constitute the commodification of bodily parts, and therefore the 
marketisation of such transactions, and is this a ‘bad thing’? One can understand the 
genuine socio-moral concerns that lead writers such as Sandel (2012) to answer ‘yes’ to all 3 
questions (Strathern 2012). However, interviewees’ accounts suggest that more complex 
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understandings of the many varied relationships between money and body parts are 
possible and necessary; the meanings and actions attached to, and around, ‘money’ are not 
straightforward.  The relationship is neither linear nor causal and the debates therefore 
cannot easily settle into either ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ the involvement of money in such transactions. 
Instead we need to follow Hoeyer’s suggestion to think  ‘...about value in a way that 
combines moral and epistemological dimensions with the notion of monetary worth, but we 
must do so reflectively and without presuming too much about what money does and what 
bodies are’ (2013,3). The interviews reported on in this chapter reinforce the need to 
examine particular cases of entanglement closely as well as the need to interrogate key 
terms, such as markets, commodification and most of all, ‘money’, even more closely. 
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